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THE “OTHER” PARENT: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF
NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS IN EMERGENCY REMOVAL
SITUATIONS
Lindsay Mather*

I. INTRODUCTION
Decades of legal jurisprudence have shown that the right to raise
one’s children as one sees fit is a fundamental right. 1 As the legal
system and society have changed, however, both the definitions and
roles of parents have changed. The increasing prevalence of divorced
parents in particular has led to the need for legal custody and visitation
arrangements. The result of these changes has been the creation of the
legal entity known as the “noncustodial parent,” the rights of which have
yet to be concretely defined. 2 The term noncustodial parent refers to a
natural parent who does not have primary custody, 3 including parents
who have regular visitation with their children as well as those who do
not.
Of the many areas in which the rights of noncustodial parents are at
issue, perhaps one of the most difficult are those situations involving
state intervention to protect the welfare of the child. When the custodial
parent becomes the subject of removal proceedings based on allegations
of child abuse or neglect, child welfare officials face the novel question
of the role noncustodial parents are to play in these situations. Cases
involving emergency removal of a child based on an imminent danger of
serious bodily harm are particularly problematic because questions of
notification of, and objection by, the noncustodial parent become an
issue.
Consider, for example, a situation in which a couple gets married, and
the marriage produces a female child. The couple subsequently
divorces, and although the divorce decree awards sole physical custody

* Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 2009–2010.
1. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), overruled as stated in Gen. Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
2. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1461 (2006).
3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (3d pocket ed. 2001).
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of the child to the mother, the father retains some right to visitation of
his daughter. Years later, the mother remarries, and the daughter reveals
to police officers that her mother’s new husband—her stepfather—has
been violent toward her and has engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct
with her. Based on the child’s statements, a police officer decides that
emergency removal of the child from the mother and stepfather’s home
is necessary because she is at risk of imminent harm. What duty, if any,
does the police officer have to notify the child’s father of her removal?
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this question in Burke v.
County of Alameda, 4 discussed below.
As yet, courts have done little to clarify the rights and roles of
noncustodial parents in these types of situations, leaving law
enforcement and child welfare officials without any meaningful
guidance. In late 2009, however, the Ninth Circuit declared that
noncustodial parents have an interest in the “companionship, care,
custody, and management” of their children that is implicated in
emergency removal situations. 5 In determining that the noncustodial
father was entitled to have a jury determine whether his rights had been
violated by the emergency removal, the court seemed to imply that
noncustodial parents should play a role in emergency removal
situations. 6 The court did not specify what actions state officials must
take to ensure that noncustodial parents’ rights are protected, however,
and other circuits have similarly failed to articulate workable standards
for these situations.
This Comment argues for clearer legal standards regarding the rights
of noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations. Part II
provides background information regarding the termination of parental
rights, including the constitutional foundation of the “right to parent”
and the process by which parents’ rights are terminated. Part III
specifically examines emergency removal, focusing on the standards by
which the appropriateness of such removal is measured. Part III also
examines abuse of emergency removal authority and qualified immunity
issues that accompany claims of abuse. Part IV analyzes the court cases
addressing the parental rights of noncustodial parents and the
ambiguities that exist with regard to noncustodial parents’ due process
rights in emergency removal situations. Finally, Part V advocates that
other circuits follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in Burke 7 and articulate the
rights of noncustodial parents. Part V also recommends that states
4.
5.
6.
7.

Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 733.
See id.
Id.
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recognize noncustodial parents as the primary placement option in
emergency removal situations—both statutorily and in child protective
services’ policies. This Comment ultimately concludes that the Ninth
Circuit’s Burke decision was important in terms of clarifying the rights
of noncustodial parents, and that state courts, legislatures, and executive
agencies need to expand on that foundation to adequately protect the
rights of noncustodial parents.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
This Part examines states’ authority to terminate parents’ rights to
their children. Subpart A explores an individual’s constitutionally
protected right to parent and the way that right is implicated in
termination proceedings. Subparts B and C then provide background
information on the termination of parental rights: B addresses states’
processes for terminating those rights; C discusses the grounds on which
termination is justified.
A. The Constitutional Right to Parent
Although it is not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the
right of a person to have and raise children is generally considered
fundamental. The foundation for this right, referred to generally in this
Comment as the “right to parent,” has been solidified by the Supreme
Court, and the integrity of the family unit has found protection in
various constitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 9 and the Ninth Amendment. 10 In its decisions
regarding the right to privacy, the Court has determined that the right
ensures that there are certain areas of one’s life into which the
government cannot intrude. 11 The Court’s various decisions have
emphasized that adults have the right to use contraceptives, 12 choose to
have an abortion, 13 live with whichever family members they choose, 14
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
9. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding the right
applies to unmarried as well as married couples).
13. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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make decisions regarding the education of their children, 15 and generally
raise their children as they see fit. The Court has emphasized that “the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.” 16
The overall tenor of the Supreme Court’s family law jurisprudence
with respect to the right to parent and, more specifically, the termination
of parental rights has been that parents have a fundamental,
constitutionally-protected interest in the continuity of the legal bond
with their children, and the Court has placed a high value on the
integrity of the family. 17 With regard to the termination of parental
rights specifically, the Court stated in Santosky v. Kramer: 18
[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody
of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained,
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life. 19

The Santosky Court not only recognized the fundamental liberty interest
parents have in raising their children, but also emphasized that parental
rights cannot be terminated without respecting the parents’ procedural
due process rights. Specifically, the Court determined that, if anything,
“persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a
more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to
destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures.” 20
While the Santosky Court did not set out definitive procedural
requirements for ensuring that parents’ due process rights were
protected, it did indicate that any analysis of what process is due is the
same in cases involving parental rights as in other cases. Specifically,
the Court cited the “three distinct factors” set out in Mathews v.
15. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), overruled as stated in Gen. Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010).
16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
17. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a parent has the primary
responsibility to care for and nurture her children); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (holding that parents have the
right to prepare their children to meet societal obligations and explaining that children are not “mere
creature[s] of the state”).
18. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
19. Id. at 753.
20. Id. at 753–54.
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Eldridge: 21 (1) the private interests affected by the action; (2) the risk of
error created by the state’s chosen procedure; and (3) the corresponding
governmental interest in utilizing the challenged procedure. 22
In cases in which the government has a compelling interest in doing
so, the state can restrict a person’s right to parent. 23 Intervention into a
situation in which a child’s safety may be at risk has traditionally been
done under the government’s authority as parens patriae. Literally
“parent of the country” in Latin, 24 this doctrine has historically stood for
the concept that the state is responsible for providing protection to those
who are unable to care for themselves. 25 Specifically, the doctrine has
been the basis for government intervention into situations in which
citizens—primarily children—are unable to protect themselves. 26
This concept does not give the government an all-access pass with
respect to inserting itself into, and terminating, the parent–child
relationship. Although the Supreme Court has not required that specific
alternatives be employed, it has implied that immediate termination of
parental rights in every case is not in keeping with the government’s
parens patriae role:
As parens patriae, the State’s goal is to provide the child with a
permanent home. Yet while there is still reason to believe that positive,
nurturing parent–child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest
favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds. “[T]he State
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children
from the custody of fit parents.” 27

While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed alternatives to
termination, lower federal courts have held that the state must consider
other options before terminating parental rights. 28 These alternatives
may include requiring parents to attend therapy with or without their
children, requiring parents to take parenting classes, or helping parents
21. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
22. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754.
23. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without constitutional
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when [the children’s] physical or mental health
is jeopardized.”).
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3d pocket ed. 2001).
25. Id.
26. It is interesting to note that parens patriae has also been employed to protect those with
mental disabilities, so the government, when dealing with mentally ill parents whose children may need
protection, may in fact have plausible grounds for protecting both the parents and the children. In the
context of the termination of parental rights, however, the government’s focus has most often been on
the children.
27. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972)).
28. See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Roe v. Conn, 417 F.
Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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slowly move toward regaining custody of their children through
supervised visitation and regular in-home supervision by a case
worker. 29 Subpart II(C) discusses the efforts states may make to
facilitate reunification of parent and child.
Overall, while the courts have recognized that the state has a valid
interest in protecting children from unfit or abusive parents, courts have
also acknowledged that parental rights are significant and should only be
permanently terminated in rare situations. The Supreme Court has,
through various decisions, recognized a person’s right to parent, and has
held that the government must respect parents’ due process rights before
interfering with the parent–child relationship. Even operating in its
capacity as parens patriae, the government has an obligation to consider
less drastic options before severing the parent–child bond entirely.
B. Process by Which a State Terminates a Parent’s Rights to a Child
Termination proceedings generally begin with a “tip” from
someone—often a concerned neighbor or a school official, physician, or
other mandatory reporter 30 —who suspects abuse or neglect. 31
Following the report of suspected abuse, the local child protective
services agency investigates the claim, and, if the investigation
substantiates the claim, the child may be temporarily removed from the
parent’s home. 32 During the period in which the child is removed from
the home, the court with jurisdiction will usually hold a series of
hearings to determine the end result of the situation. 33 Also during this
interim period, the state is typically required to create a “reunification
plan” and to provide the parent with services aimed at facilitating
reunification with the child. 34
29. Courts have wide discretion in creating case plans for the reunification of parents with their
children; these are merely a few of the options available to the court.
30. For a more in-depth treatment of mandatory reporters, see CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2010),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf.
Most
jurisdictions
designate professions whose members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment. Although it
may vary by state, the list may include social workers, teachers and other school personnel, physicians
and other healthcare workers, mental health professionals, childcare providers, medical examiners or
coroners, and law enforcement officers. Id.
31. See Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Parental
Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1435
(1995).
32. Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the
Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 402
(2000).
33. Id. See generally Watkins, supra note 31.
34. This requirement is discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
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While reunification with the parent is always the goal, in certain
situations it may not be feasible. If, after a set amount of time,
reunification has not occurred, the state can move to terminate the
parent’s rights to the child. In order to overcome the strong policy
preferring reunification, the state must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that reunification is not, and will not be in the future, in the
child’s best interest. 35 Correspondingly, if a preponderance of the
evidence shows that a child can safely return to the parent, or that
progress has been made and reunification is likely to be possible in the
future, parental rights will not be terminated. 36 In the former situation,
the parent and child will be reunited; in the latter, the removal and
reunification plans will remain in place until reunification is
appropriate. 37
C. Grounds for the Termination of Parental Rights
The grounds for the state’s termination of parental rights arise from
the specific circumstances under which a child cannot safely be returned
to his parents because of the risk of harm by the parent or the parent’s
inability to provide for the child’s basic needs. 38 Because each state is
allowed to enact its own legislation with respect to issues such as
termination of parental rights, the specific grounds for such action vary
from state to state; however, certain commonalities exist among the
states. In many states, the government can terminate parental rights in
situations in which any of the following are present: (1) severe or
chronic abuse or neglect; (2) abuse or neglect of other children in the
household; (3) abandonment; (4) long-term substance abuse of the
parents resulting in incapacity; (5) failure to support or maintain contact
with the child; or (6) involuntary termination of the parental rights of the
parent to another child. 39 These various grounds often fall under the
broad “unfitness” standard used by many states. 40 In many states, long35. Kerr, supra note 32, at 402. See generally Watkins, supra note 31; Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982).
36. Kerr, supra note 32, at 403.
37. Id.
38. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2010), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundterminall.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE INFO].
39. Id.
40. Some states do not provide a definition of “unfitness,” leaving the determination in such
cases to the discretion of the judge hearing the case. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(e) (West 2010);
MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(5) (West 2010). Other
states provide specific definitions or parameters for “unfitness.” See, for example, 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/1 D (West 2010), in which the Illinois legislature has set out eighteen factors, any one of
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term mental illness or deficiency of a parent is also recognized as valid
grounds for terminating parental rights. 41
Additionally, in some states, if a child has been in a placement outside
of the parent’s care for a statutorily-defined length of time, and the
parent has failed to correct the conditions which led to the child’s initial
removal, that failure constitutes valid grounds for termination. These
grounds necessarily require that the state attempt to provide services to
assist the parent in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of
the child before terminating the parent’s rights. Specifically, states are
required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and child by
offering services to the parent. 42 These “reasonable efforts” may
include services such as counseling or other mental health services,
substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, assisting with the provision
of housing, or any other services realistically focused on meeting the
parent’s and child’s needs. 43 The state must be diligent in its efforts to
implement the necessary services. 44 To justify removal, the state must
also prove that the parent did not benefit from the services, did not use
the services, or was unlikely to benefit from the services. 45
The decision to terminate parental rights generally involves two steps;
the court must find that: (1) there is clear and convincing evidence of
parental misconduct or inability; 46 and (2) the termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the child. The aforementioned grounds
for termination satisfy the first requirement. In order for a court to make
a determination as to the second step of the process, it should consider
the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition as well as

which can indicate unfitness.
41. CHILD WELFARE INFO, supra note 38. See also, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(e) (West
2010); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(5) (West 2010).
Even in the absence of statutes specifically indicating that mental illness is a basis for an “unfitness”
determination, courts often use the label of “mental deficiency” in making decisions about the
termination of parental rights. See, e.g., R.G. v. Marion County Office, 647 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282 (Me. 1993); In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1989).
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–28 (2006), which require states, in order to receive certain federal
funding, to make reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her natural parents. Several state
statutes impose a similar requirement. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (2010); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(IV) (2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 384-b (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010).
43. See, e.g., In re Weaver, 606 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
44. See, e.g., State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978).
45. See, e.g., State v. Michael B (In re Michael B.), 604 N.W.2d 405 (Neb. 2000).
46. In Santosky, the Supreme Court held that the standard in termination proceedings must be
clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, because the action of
terminating parental rights is so “severe and irreversible.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759
(1982).
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the child’s needs. 47
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a right to parent, it has
also recognized that the right is not indestructible—it can be superseded
by the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of minor children. In
those situations in which the state’s interest outweighs the parents’, the
children can be removed and the parental rights terminated.
Termination only happens upon a showing of unfitness, but the basis for
initially removing children from their parents’ homes need not meet
such a demanding standard.
III. EMERGENCY REMOVAL
This Part specifically examines emergency removal, which occurs in
situations in which a child’s safety is in imminent risk of harm. Subpart
A focuses on the standards by which the appropriateness of emergency
removal is measured. Subpart B then turns to an analysis of Burke v.
County of Alameda, 48 a Ninth Circuit case that specifically examines the
rights of noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations.
A. Emergency Removal Standards
Removal of a child from the home of his parents generally occurs
after the local social services agency has conducted an investigation,
evidence of abuse or neglect has been collected, and a judge has issued a
court order for the child’s removal. 49 In some situations, however, state
officials find that circumstances exist in which the child is in imminent
danger, and therefore needs to be removed immediately and without
waiting for a court order. Although emergency removal is permitted in
47. See, e.g., In re L.H., 511 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
48. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
49. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[G]overnmental officials
will not remove a child from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in
a court order of removal, absent exigent circumstances.”) (citation omitted). See also Hollingsworth v.
Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Removal of children from the custody of their parents
requires predeprivation notice and a hearing ‘except for extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’”); Malik v.
Arapahoe County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 191 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] parent has a liberty
interest in familial association and privacy that [—absent extraordinary circumstances—] cannot be
violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures.”) (citation omitted). But see Lossman v.
Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 291–92 (7th Cir. 1983) (“When a child’s safety is threatened, that is
justification enough for action first and hearing afterward.”) (citation omitted); Jordan by Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nly where a child’s life is in imminent danger or where
there is imminent danger of severe or irremediable injury to the child’s health (and prior judicial
authorization is not immediately obtainable) may an official summarily assume custody of a child from
his parents.”) (citation omitted).
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such situations, states have carefully crafted specific standards to ensure
that it only occurs in true emergencies.
In general, emergency removal is justified when the state official has
reasonable cause to suspect the child is in immediate physical danger
from which the state needs to protect him. 50 Courts have determined
that, in such situations, state officials are not required to wait to obtain a
court order before removal when the child’s “life or limb is in immediate
jeopardy.” 51 Where “[f]urther investigation could result in delay during
which the . . . abuse could [] continue[],” state officials are justified in
removing the child. 52
In determining whether this type of emergency situation exists,
officials are to consider all relevant factors, including:
whether there was time to obtain a court order . . .[,] the nature of the
abuse (its severity, duration, and frequency), the strength of the evidence
supporting the allegations of abuse, the risk that the parent will flee with
the child, the possibility of less extreme solutions to the problem, and any
harm to the child that might result from the removal. 53

Courts have been careful to emphasize that this list is not all-inclusive,
however, and have emphasized that no one factor in particular ought to
be given more weight than any other. 54 This flexible, factor-based test
gives guidance to child welfare officials facing situations in which
emergency removal may be necessary. 55
When parents initiate a court action challenging the actions of state
officials in removing children from their homes in such emergency
situations, the question of whether the officials’ actions were appropriate
is generally one for the jury. Where a court finds, however, that no
rational jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the
officials to believe that removal of the children was necessary to protect
them from immediate physical danger, the officials are entitled to
summary judgment. 56
The policy rationale behind this result is simple. The ultimate
decision of whether to remove a child in a given situation rests,
50. P.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Families, 662 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (D. Conn. 2009). See
also, e.g., Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009); Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d
386, 389 (5th Cir. 2009).
51. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
52. Doe v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 712 F. Supp. 277, 285–86 (D. Conn. 1989).
53. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th Cir. 2008).
54. See, e.g., id.; Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 398.
55. Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 400.
56. P.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Children & Families, 662 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (D. Conn. 2009). See
also Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009); Wernecke, 591 F.3d 386.
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appropriately, on the shoulders of the official, and there is value in
allowing the official to use her judgment with respect to whether
removal is appropriate. To prescribe certain actions that must be taken
or certain conditions that must exist prior to removal could deter an
honest official from taking action to protect a child who really is at
risk. 57 Such a result is directly contrary to the interest of the community
in protecting its children from harm. 58 “When a child’s safety is
threatened, that is justification enough for action first and hearing
afterward.” 59
B. Burke v. County of Alameda
In Wallis v. Spencer, 60 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recognized, as the Supreme Court has done many times, 61 that parents
and children have a constitutional right to live together and be free from
governmental interference. 62 The Wallis court emphasized that any
separation of parent and child requires the state to afford the parent due
process of law, 63 and declared:
[o]fficials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without
prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the
time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the
child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of
the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury. 64

Following the Wallis decision, courts acknowledged a two-prong
standard for determining the appropriateness of emergency removal: (1)
the state has reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger;
and (2) the scope of the intrusion on the parents’ due process rights was
reasonable in light of the circumstances. 65 However, the Wallis standard
was only applied to custodial parents. 66
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed the rights of noncustodial
parents, recognizing that noncustodial parents have a reduced liberty
interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their
57.
58.
59.
omitted).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 712 F. Supp at 286.
Id.
Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation
Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1136.
Id.
Id. at 1138 (citation omitted).
See generally Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 731–33 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 733.
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children. 67 The court had not elaborated on the rights of noncustodial
parents following that decision, however, until late in 2009 in Burke v.
County of Alameda. 68 The Ninth Circuit in Burke held that the Wallis
test applied to any parent with legal custody—including noncustodial
parents. 69
1. Background and Facts
Burke dealt with the emergency removal of a young woman, B.F.,
from the home of her mother and stepfather, the Burkes. On July 12,
2005, Officer Mark Foster of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office
interviewed B.F. because she ran away from home a few weeks earlier,
and he wanted to discuss the circumstances surrounding the runaway. 70
During the course of the interview, B.F. disclosed that her stepfather had
smacked her several times on the face when she returned home after
having run away. 71 B.F. also told the interviewer that her stepfather
often made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and that he frequently
pinched her buttocks and grabbed her breasts. 72 B.F.’s comments
indicated that her mother was aware of the abuse, but did not take
adequate measures to stop it. 73
Based on these facts, Officer Foster removed B.F. from the Burkes
and placed her in protective custody. 74 Officer Foster did not seek a
custody warrant before executing the emergency removal and did not
contact B.F.’s biological father. 75 B.F.’s noncustodial father found out
about the removal two days afterward. 76 B.F.’s mother and noncustodial
father brought suit against both the county and Officer Foster under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Foster’s actions deprived them of their
constitutional right of familial association. 77 The district court granted
summary judgment for the county and Officer Foster. 78

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
Burke, 586 F.3d at 725.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. B.F.’s Parents’ § 1983 Claims Against Officer Foster
Because qualified immunity is a defense to § 1983 claims against
state officials, the test for determining whether a violation occurred
involves two questions: first, did the defendant’s actions violate the
Constitution; and second, was the right violated clearly established at the
time of the defendant’s actions. 79 If both questions are answered in the
affirmative, the actor is not entitled to qualified immunity and can be
held liable under § 1983.
In the context of emergency removal, the question of whether the
Constitution was violated also turns on a two-part analysis—the
aforementioned Wallis test. The Wallis test indicates that emergency
removal is not unconstitutional if the state has reasonable cause to
believe the child is in imminent danger, and the scope of the intrusion on
the parents’ rights was reasonable given the circumstances. 80 Here, if a
jury were to find that Officer Foster had reasonable cause to believe that
B.F. was in imminent danger and that the intrusion on B.F.’s parents’
rights was reasonable, the Constitution was not violated.
If Officer Foster’s actions in this case did violate one of the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, the § 1983 inquiry turns to whether the law
protecting that right was clearly established at the time the actions were
taken. The Ninth Circuit has held that a law is clearly established when
it is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that [constitutional] right.” 81
a. Reasonable Cause and Imminent Danger
In B.F.’s case, the Ninth Circuit had little trouble finding reasonable
cause for her removal. B.F.’s parents attempted to argue that the state
could not have had reasonable cause because B.F. was lying. 82 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that a victim’s report of
abuse is compelling evidence. 83 Such a statement provides the
necessary “specific, articulable evidence” required to support a claim of
reasonable cause. 84 No rational jury, therefore, could conclude that
Officer Foster’s reliance on B.F.’s statement of abuse was

79. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
80. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Burke, 586 F.3d at 731–33.
81. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks, citation, and
emphasis omitted).
82. Burke, 586 F.3d at 731.
83. Id.
84. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138.
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unreasonable. 85
With respect to imminent danger, the police “must have reasonable
cause to believe that harm will occur in the period of time it would take
to procure a warrant and remove the child from the home.” 86 In B.F.’s
case, she reported that her stepfather’s sexual abuse occurred
sporadically, so Officer Foster could have believed that she would again
be sexually abused in the time it took to get a warrant. 87 The court
determined that, had this been the sole basis for believing B.F. was in
imminent danger, whether that belief was reasonable would have been
for a jury to decide. 88
The threat of continuing sexual abuse was not the only basis for
Officer Foster’s belief, however. B.F. commented during the interview
that things would be “worse for her” when she got home if her mother
and stepfather knew what she had revealed to the police. 89 She also
described several threats her stepfather had made to beat her, and
recounted the beating he administered when she returned home after
running away. 90 This additional threat of violence, combined with the
threat of continuing sexual abuse, satisfied the imminent danger
requirement, the court held, because no rational jury could conclude that
it was unreasonable for Officer Foster to believe that B.F. was in
imminent danger of physical harm. 91
b. Scope of the Intrusion with Respect to B.F.’s Father 92
The question of whether the intrusion was reasonable with respect to
B.F.’s biological father’s rights was one of first impression for the Ninth
Circuit. The court had previously acknowledged that noncustodial
85. Burke, 586 F.3d at 731.
86. Id. at 731–32 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 732.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 729. B.F.’s mother confirmed the incident in which B.F.’s stepfather slapped her
several times for having run away. Id. at 730.
91. Id. at 732.
92. The court concluded that the scope of the intrusion with respect to B.F.’s mother had been
reasonable. Id. at 733. In circumstances in which the source of the abuse is not the biological parent but
a stepparent, courts will sometimes place the child with the mother, but out of the presence of the
abuser. The Ninth Circuit determined in Mabe v. San Bernadino County, Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007),
that “where the official reasonably believed that the mother was not protecting the child, ‘removal from
the mother was reasonably necessary as well.’” Burke, 586 F.3d at 733 (quoting Mabe, 237 F.3d at
1110). The court in Burke determined that because B.F.’s mother had not taken appropriate steps to stop
the abuse of B.F., of which she had knowledge, and because she had accused B.F. of lying about the
abuse, she was not protecting B.F., and the removal was therefore reasonably necessary. Id. at 733.
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parents’ liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of their children is reduced. 93 The court emphasized in
Burke, however, that “even if [B.F.’s father’s] interest in B.F.’s
companionship was somehow reduced, he was not without any interest
in the custody and management of B.F.” 94 As a result, the court
extended the holding from Wallis to apply to all parents with legal
custody, even if they do not possess physical custody of their children. 95
In the specific case at bar, the court determined that the
reasonableness of Officer Foster’s intrusion on B.F.’s father’s rights was
for a jury to decide. 96 B.F.’s father was not accused of violence or abuse
at any point in B.F.’s interview. 97 B.F. had mentioned to the officers
that she did not feel as though she were welcome in her father’s home,
but never indicated she did not feel safe there or made allegations of
abuse. 98 The officers, however, did not at any point attempt to contact
B.F.’s father, and did not explore the option of placing B.F. in his care
instead of taking her into protective custody. 99 In fact, two days passed
before B.F.’s father had any knowledge of B.F.’s removal from her
mother and stepfather’s home. 100 The court held that granting summary
judgment in favor of Officer Foster and the county on this aspect was
improper because rational juries could differ regarding whether Officer
Foster’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances.101
c. Officer Foster’s Qualified Immunity
Because B.F.’s father had raised a triable issue of fact regarding
whether his constitutional rights had been violated by Officer Foster’s
actions, the court then examined whether Officer Foster was protected
by qualified immunity. Even when the actions of an official, acting
under the color of state authority, violate the Constitution, the official is
entitled to qualified immunity unless the law was so “clearly

93. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
94. Burke, 586 F.3d at 733.
95. Id. The court recognized that the Wallis test is a flexible one, and the individual
circumstances of each case must be considered. For example, if the noncustodial parent lives a great
distance away, and the child is in imminent danger of harm, it might be reasonable for the official to
remove the child from the custodial parent’s home without first attempting to place the child in the
noncustodial parent’s custody. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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established” that a reasonable official would have known that his actions
violated that right. 102
The Ninth Circuit determined that, because its previous cases referred
only to the removal of a child from “the custody of its parent,” 103
Officer Foster’s actions were not inherently unreasonable, and he was
therefore entitled to immunity. 104 “Custody,” the court said, was never
explicitly defined, and is commonly thought of as referring only to
physical custody. 105 Given this legal backdrop, the court was unwilling
to say that it was clearly unlawful for Officer Foster and the other
officials involved in B.F.’s removal to have failed to contact B.F.’s
father because he did not have physical custody of B.F. 106 As a result,
the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment with
respect to Officer Foster. 107
3. B.F.’s Parents’ § 1983 Claims Against Alameda County
The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to remedy violations of
constitutional rights by state officials. 108 Section 1983 claims can be
brought against both individual state officials and municipalities. In this
case, B.F.’s parents sued both Officer Foster and Alameda County for
allegedly depriving them of their constitutional rights to familial
association by removing B.F. from her mother’s care without a warrant
and without notifying B.F.’s father. 109
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show
that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a
policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to her
constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” 110
The district court granted summary
judgment to Alameda County because it found no constitutional
violation. 111 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision. 112 The
102. Id.
103. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Mabe v. San Bernadino
County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Beltran v. Santa
Clara County, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
104. Burke, 586 F.3d at 734.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Caballero v. Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. Burke, 586 F.3d at 730.
110. Mabe v. San Bernadino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled by Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 505
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
111. Burke, 586 F.3d at 730.
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court determined that B.F.’s father had raised a triable issue of fact
regarding whether Officer Foster’s failure to contact him was a violation
of his constitutional right to familial association. 113 The summary
judgment in Officer Foster’s favor was upheld because Foster was
entitled to immunity, but municipalities are not entitled to qualified
immunity. 114 The Ninth Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the lower court for
a determination regarding whether B.F.’s father’s claim against the
county satisfied the other requirements of a § 1983 claim. 115
IV. THE UNDEFINED LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS
Although in Burke the Ninth Circuit clearly held that the rights of
noncustodial parents must be considered in emergency removal
situations, it is the only court to have done so. Additionally, Burke
merely recognized that noncustodial parents have an interest that needs
to be protected in such situations; it did nothing in the way of suggesting
how to afford that protection. No other court has made such suggestions
either, and the lack of guidance from the courts results in uncertainty for
state officials who want to respect noncustodial parents’ rights but are
unsure of how to do so. This Part identifies the lack of identifiable
standards and emphasizes the problems that arise in their absence.
A. Most Jurisdictions Have Not Articulated Standards
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed the rights of noncustodial
parents, recognizing that parents who do not have primary custody retain
a liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management
of their children. 116
The court also held that the “interest is
unambiguously lesser in magnitude than that of a parent with full legal
custody” because it has been reduced by the terms of the custody
judgment. 117 Other circuits have reached similar conclusions and either
explicitly or implicitly found an existing and somewhat reduced liberty
interest of noncustodial parents in the care, custody, and management of
their children. 118

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 1996); Franz v. United States, 707 F. 2d
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Beyond acknowledging the existence of these rights, however, courts
have largely been silent with respect to the specific rights of
noncustodial parents. With the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Burke, no other court of appeals has expressly recognized the
relevance of the rights of noncustodial parents in emergency removal
situations. State officials therefore lack specific direction regarding
what actions they need to take to protect noncustodial parents’ rights.
Like the courts, most legislatures and child protective services
agencies have not acknowledged the rights of noncustodial parents or
identified the specific steps that must be taken to protect those rights.
Only one state statute requires consideration of the noncustodial parent
as the primary placement option in emergency removal situations. 119
Other statutes call for initially attempting to place children with
“qualified relatives” in such situations, but do not mention noncustodial
parents. 120 Similarly, a search revealed that policy manuals for child
protective services agencies also fail to specify the actions that officials
should take respecting a child’s noncustodial parents in emergency
removal situations. 121
The lack of clarity regarding the rights of noncustodial parents creates
confusion for state officials removing children from their homes in
emergency situations. In the absence of direction from legislatures,
child protective services agencies, and the courts, the rights of
noncustodial parents remain unclear, and therefore state officials are
prevented from taking appropriate action to protect those rights in
emergency removal situations.

582, 594–602 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331–33 (10th Cir. 1981); Weller v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 394 (4th Cir. 1990); Terry v. Richardson, 346 F.3d 781, 784 (7th
Cir. 2003).
119. The Utah Code states, in pertinent part: “The following order of preference shall be applied
when determining the person with whom a child will be placed in an emergency placement . . . : (i) a
noncustodial parent of the child . . . ; (ii) a relative of the child.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a209(4)(a)(i)–(ii) (West 2010).
120. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.090(1) (West 2010), CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE
§ 309 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3(a) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(C) (West
2010).
121. See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available at http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/
GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel=100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T
HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVS., CHILD PROTEDCTIVE SERVICES (2008),
available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/CPSManual/cps-manual.pdf. A search revealed
only one manual that contained specific direction regarding actions to be taken respecting noncustodial
parents; that manual is discussed in Part V.
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B. Problems Arising from the Lack of Standards
The lack of clearly articulated standards poses several problems. One
significant problem is that, although courts have recognized the valid,
constitutionally-protected liberty interests of noncustodial parents in
familial association with their children, these rights are not being
respected in emergency removal situations. This problem stems from
the absence of standards articulating the actions officials must take to
respect noncustodial parents’ rights in such situations.
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Burke, “even if [B.F.’s father’s]
interest in B.F.’s companionship was somehow reduced [because he is a
noncustodial parent], he was not without any interest in the custody and
management of B.F.” 122 Constitutional violations are not viewed in
terms of the value of the right or the strength of the liberty interest
involved; there is either a violation of a constitutionally-protected right
or there is not. In the case of noncustodial parents, the right to make
decisions with respect to the care, custody, and management of their
children, however diminished, is violated whenever they are not
afforded due process in emergency removal situations. Articulated
standards are necessary to ensure that the rights of all concerned parties
are protected.
A second and closely related problem stemming from the lack of clear
standards of action in cases involving noncustodial parents is that
officials are uncertain regarding what actions to take. One option, of
course, is to continue executing emergency removals according to
existing procedures. This is problematic, however, because in many
situations the existing procedures ignore the rights of noncustodial
parents entirely.
In the alternative, officials concerned with protecting the rights of all
parties involved, including noncustodial parents, may hesitate before
taking necessary action to remove a child from imminent danger. That
is, officials may delay removal until the noncustodial parent can be
contacted, in which case the child will likely be placed back in the
custody of the custodial parent, where the risk of harm originally arose.
Such a result, as previously discussed, is not in the best interests of the
community. The entire purpose of emergency removal is to protect
children from harm; if officials hesitate in executing such removals for
fear of violating noncustodial parents’ rights, that purpose is not being
served. If clear standards were articulated, however, officials would not
have to concern themselves with violating any party’s rights because
they would be following procedures designed to protect the interests of
122. Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009).
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all involved.
A third and final problem that arises from the lack of articulated
standards relates back to the issue of qualified immunity. Individuals
whose constitutional rights have been violated by persons acting under
color of state law can bring claims for remedies under § 1983.123
Naturally, then, if noncustodial parents have constitutional rights to their
children that are violated in emergency removal situations, a § 1983 suit
should provide them with a remedy. The problem, however, is that
individual state actors are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.
As discussed in previous subparts, an official is entitled to qualified
immunity unless the right violated was clearly established. With the
exception of the Ninth Circuit in Burke, courts have not clearly held that
noncustodial parents are entitled to the same due process protections in
emergency removal situations as custodial parents. As a result,
noncustodial parents bringing claims under § 1983 would have difficulty
proving that their rights were “clearly established.” If officials cannot
be held liable for their actions (or, in most cases, inactions) toward
noncustodial parents, a § 1983 claim cannot function as it was intended.
The lack of clearly articulated standards in this area of the law
presents several problems. Noncustodial parents have important
interests in the “care, custody, and management” of their children,
especially when a child is being removed from the custodial parent’s
home. These rights are largely ignored, however, in emergency removal
situations. The alternative, that officials delay action due to the
uncertainty regarding noncustodial parents, is no better. Additionally,
§ 1983 cannot protect the rights of noncustodial parents against
violations by state officials if the law is never “clearly established”
enough to support a § 1983 claim against the individual state actors.
The issue of noncustodial parents is not likely going away any time
soon, and these problems need to be addressed.
V. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR PROTECTING NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS’
RIGHTS
Articulated standards provide law enforcement and child welfare
officials with guidance in emergency situations. A lack of standards,
correspondingly, creates confusion in those situations for officials. This
Part proposes changes that can be made and procedures that can be
implemented in emergency removal situations in order to protect
noncustodial parents’ liberty interests in the care, custody, and

123. Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992).
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management of their children. These changes should occur in every
branch of government—judicial, legislative, and executive.
As an initial step, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in
Burke, and unequivocally hold that noncustodial parents have the same
due process rights in emergency removal situations as custodial
parents. 124 Several courts of appeals have acknowledged, either
explicitly or implicitly, that noncustodial parents have a protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. 125 These
courts have also held, however, that this interest is reduced by virtue of
the parent’s noncustodial status. 126 Although they have touted the
existence of this reduced liberty interest, courts have largely been silent
with respect to defining noncustodial parents’ rights further. To begin to
alleviate the confusion surrounding noncustodial parents’ rights, other
courts should explicitly declare that the rights of noncustodial parents in
emergency removal situations are the same as those of custodial parents.
Clear definition by the courts of the constitutional rights of noncustodial
parents will likely prompt the other branches of government to take
steps to ensure protection of those rights.
In addition to the need for court recognition of noncustodial parents’
rights, state legislatures need to statutorily acknowledge the propriety of
considering placement of children removed in emergencies with their
noncustodial parents before considering other placement options. A
survey of state statutes revealed that Utah is the only state to currently
have such a provision. 127 Utah’s statute lists the “order of preference”
for placement of children in emergency situations, and lists noncustodial
parents as the first option. 128 Other state legislatures should include in
their statutes similar provisions stating a preference for placement with
noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations. Leadership from
the legislature on this issue may even prompt the other branches of
government to make necessary changes as well.
Finally, in the executive branch, child protective services agencies
124. Burke, 586 F.3d at 733.
125. Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 1996); Franz v. United States, 707 F. 2d
582, 594–602 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331–33 (10th Cir. 1981); Weller v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 394 (4th Cir. 1990); Terry v. Richardson, 346 F.3d 781, 784 (7th
Cir. 2003).
126. Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he interest [of noncustodial
parents] is subject to a de minimis exception . . . .”); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Such an interest is unambiguously lesser in magnitude than that of a parent with full legal
custody.”); Zakrzewski, 87 F.3d at 1014 (“Zakrzewski’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree” under which
he is a noncustodial parent.).
127. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A–4a–209(4)(a)(i) (West 2010).
128. Id.
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need to establish concrete policies that accommodate the due process
rights of noncustodial parents. As alluded to in Part IV, many training
manuals for child protective services agencies fail to indicate the actions
that need to be taken with respect to noncustodial parents. 129 Many of
these manuals direct social services officials to first attempt to place
children with relatives before considering outside placements such as
foster care, but do not specifically direct the officials to contact any
noncustodial parent of the child. Iowa’s Department of Human Services
Social Services Policy Manual, however, clearly directs state officials to
consider any noncustodial parent as the first placement option when
there is an emergency need for the child to be removed from the
custodial parent’s home. 130 The manual then directs state officials to
attempt to locate other qualified family members as a second placement
option. 131 Other child protective services agencies should similarly
direct officials to first consider noncustodial parents as a placement
option in emergency removal situations.
States should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Utah legislature, and the Iowa Department of Human Services Social
Services Agency in order to secure protection for the rights of
noncustodial parents in emergency removal situations.
More
specifically, states should consider noncustodial parents as the first
placement option following an emergency removal. Officials would of
course have to take into account the specific facts of each case, such as
the feasibility of immediate placement with a geographically distant
noncustodial parent or the relative safety of placing the child with a
noncustodial parent in lieu of another placement option. 132 If the
129. See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available at http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/
GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel=100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T
HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVS., CHILD PROTEDCTIVE SERVICES (2008),
available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/CPSManual/cps-manual.pdf.
130. IOWA DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE SERV., EMPLOYEES’ MANUAL:
ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT INFORMATION (2006), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysis/
PolicyManualPages/Manual_Documents/Master/17-b4.pdf.
131. Id.
132. In Burke, the Ninth Circuit was careful to note that
the test in Wallis is flexible and must take into account the individual circumstances. For
example, if the parent without physical custody does not reside nearby, and a child is in
imminent danger of harm, it is probably reasonable for a police officer to place a child in
protective custody without attempting to place the child with the geographically distant
parent.
Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009). When determining the propriety of
placement with a noncustodial parent, child protective services agencies would have to perform the
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necessary change occurs in all facets of state governments, noncustodial
parents will be the first consideration for emergency placements, and as
a result their rights will be protected in these situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
At a time when divorce is remarkably commonplace and the concept
of family has become fluid, it can no longer be assumed that all children
reside with their biological parents, or even that both of a child’s
biological parents are involved in the child’s life. The constitutional
rights of noncustodial parents with respect to their children are not the
same as those of custodial parents, but despite the reduced interest in the
“care, custody, and management” of their children, noncustodial parents
are not completely without legally cognizable rights. This is especially
true in situations in which the state, acting as parens patriae, has
determined that the custodial parent is unfit to care for—and is therefore
unfit to retain custody of—the child. In such situations, it would seem
the noncustodial parent undoubtedly has a right to assume such custody
of the child.
While this may seem to be a logical conclusion, however, it is not as
simple as it may appear, particularly given the numerous complexities
related to the removal of children from their homes. More specifically,
in instances of emergency removal, in which a police officer or child
welfare official believes that a child is at an imminent risk of serious
harm in the home of the custodial parent, officials may need to make
rapid decisions in the interest of the child’s safety. The rights of the
noncustodial parent may be overlooked in the face of these emergency
situations.
This Comment has argued that, absent clearer standards from
government entities, the rights of noncustodial parents will continue to

same background investigations to ensure that the placement is safe for the child. See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHAPTER VIII: PROTECTIVE SERVICES, NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (2010), available at http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm60/man/; OHIO DEP’T JOBS & FAM. SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKER MANUAL, available
at
http://emanuals.odjfs.state.oh.us/emanuals/GetTocDescendants.do?maxChildrenInLevel=
100&nodeId=%23node-id%28167%29; ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S
SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (2008), available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/ocs/Publications/
CPSManual/cps-manual.pdf. These investigations would have to include not only criminal background
checks but also the noncustodial parent’s history with the child, such as whether the noncustodial parent
had ever been abusive toward the child. A search revealed only one manual that contained specific
direction regarding actions to be taken respecting noncustodial parents. See IOWA DEP’T OF HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD WELFARE SERV., EMPLOYEES’ MANUAL: ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT INFORMATION
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysis/PolicyManualPages/Manual_Documents/
Master/17-b4.pdf.
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be ignored in emergency removal situations. The right of the state to
conduct emergency removals is vitally important, as no child should
have to suffer further abuse while officials are waiting to obtain a court
order. This Comment in no way advocates diminishing the state’s
authority to act in that capacity. What it does argue, however, is that the
state should make reasonable efforts to place the child with the
noncustodial parent. Courts should therefore follow the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Burke v. County of Alameda 133 and clearly state the rights of
noncustodial parents; legislatures should indicate an order of preference
for placements in emergency removal situations that begins with the
noncustodial parents; and child protective services agencies should
create clear procedures that direct officials to consider noncustodial
parents as the first placement option in those situations.

133. Burke, 586 F.3d at 725.
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